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This essay brings to a formal close SERRC’s review symposium on my book Science as Social 
Existence: Heidegger and the Sociology of Scientific Knowledge (Open Book Publishers, 2017). All 
told, four reviewers stepped forward: Raphael Sassower (2018); Pablo Schyfter (2018); Paolo 
Palladino (2018); and Adam Riggio (2018); listed here in the order in which their reviews 
have appeared. My thanks to them for their thoughtful and often spirited engagement with 
my book. 
 
I have already responded to Sassower and Schyfter separately (Kochan 2018a & 2018b), so 
my main task here will be to respond to Palladino and Riggio. My thanks go, as well, to Eric 
Kerr, who has organised this symposium. 
 
Why Bother Being Epochal? 
 
I coulda been a contender! 
I coulda been somebody... 
– Marlon Brando as Terry Malloy in On the Waterfront (1954) 
 
This symposium was kicked off last May by Raphael Sassower (2018). Six months out, Adam 
Riggio has now brought up the rear, rounding out the reviewers’ side by crystallising 
Sassower’s initial criticism of Science as Social Existence into two words: ‘Why bother?’ (Riggio 
2018, 53). 
 
As a question directed at me – ‘Why bother writing Science as Social Existence?’ – the answer is 
easy: because I felt like it. It was a joy (in a weirdly afflicted way) to write the book, and a joy 
to see it published. That the SERRC books editor then offered to organise a book 
symposium was a wonderful surprise, outstripping my expectations. 
 
On the other hand, as a question directed at potential readers – ‘Why bother reading Science 
as Social Existence?’ – the answer is more difficult to give, because, at the end of the day, it is 
not mine to give. I am sure that, had I tried to predict and pursue the fashions of the 
academic marketplace, I would have ended up feeling miserable. By my reckoning, it was 
better to write from a place of joy, and give a few readers the best of what I have, than to 
chase popular demand, and deliver something fashionable but personally hollow. Luckily, my 
wonderful publisher is not in the business of making money. 
 
It is fortuitous that one symposiast, Paolo Palladino, has already answered the second 
question for me. After summarising his appreciation for several aspects of Science as Social 
Existence, Palladino concludes: ‘All this seems to me a wholly satisfactory answer to 
Sassower’s question’ (Palladino 2018, 43). 
 
Predictably, some tough guys will scoff at joy. Either because they already have so much they 
cannot see the need for more, or because they have so little they cannot abide seeing it in 
others. Riggio has shared with us his insights about disciplinarity, culled from his ‘decade of 









academia could use more joy. ‘Why bother?’ is really a bureaucrat’s question, asked by hiring, 
funding, and promotions committees. Perhaps better questions could be asked. 
 
Presumably Riggio would not begrudge me my joy, but his interests do lie elsewhere. He 
wants me to be ‘epochal’ (Riggio 2018, 58). According to him, had I not allegedly hobbled 
myself with disciplinarity, then, ‘[i]nstead of writing about Martin Heidegger and David 
Bloor, he [being me] could have written something with the potential to leave him [being me] 
mentioned in the same breath as such epochal thinkers. He could have become epochal 
himself. [...] How about next time, Jeff?’ (Riggio 2018, 58). Wow. That is quite flattering ... I 
guess. But my answer is: ‘no thanks.’ Not this time, and not the next time either. 
 
But no worries. There is a lot of beautiful space between the dizzying heights of epochaldom 
and a one-way ticket to Palookaville. 
 
Who Will Bother to Read Science as Social Existence? 
 
Yes, who will bother to read my book? It is still too early to tell, with the data sample still 
quite small. As far as SERRC goes, the sample is exactly four. Let us start with the first 
reviewer: why did Sassower read Science as Social Existence? I must admit that I am already 
stumped. Nevertheless, Sassower’s review sparked the symposium that has now followed, 
and I am warmly grateful to him for that. 
 
The second reviewer is Pablo Schyfter. Why did Schyfter read Science as Social Existence? Here 
the reasons seem more easily accessible, and Riggio’s reflections on disciplinarity can help us 
to draw them out. 
 
Riggio finds it frustrating that I organised my book as a constructive dialogue between two 
academic disciplines: Heidegger Studies; and Sociology of Scientific Knowledge (SSK). He 
laments ‘how vulnerable this makes him [being me] to academic attacks’ (Riggio 2018, 53). 
He offers Sassower’ review as a case in point. 
 
But Riggio might just as well have offered Schyfter’s review. As I note in my response to the 
latter, Schyfter fashions himself as SSK’s disciplinary gate-keeper, and he tries to paint me as 
an attempted gate-crasher (Kochan 2018b). His self-appointed goal is to protect the purity of 
SSK against my perceived infiltration from without. But Schyfter fails to realise that I am 
already well within the gates, because the boundaries of the discipline are much less precise 
than he would like us to believe. 
 
This is a point Riggio also fails to realise, and so my separate response to Schyfter may also 
serve as a response to Riggio’s similar criticisms in respect of my presentation of SSK. 
 
The third reviewer is Palladino, and the why-question has already been answered. He read 
Science as Social Existence because he thought it was interesting: ‘I hope to have conveyed how 
much I enjoyed thinking about the questions Science as Social Existence poses’ (Palladino 2018, 
46). Naturally, I am warmly grateful to Palladino as well. 
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Reviewer number four is Riggio. Why did he read it? He appears to equivocate. 
 
Why All this Bother about Disciplinarity? 
 
On the one hand, Riggio seems to have read the book because it interested him. He starts by 
saying that Science as Social Existence offers a ‘constructive dialogue’ between Heidegger and 
SSK, that ‘[t]his open-minded approach to problem solving remains sadly rare in academic 
culture,’ and that ‘such a trans-disciplinary philosophical project is worthwhile and valuable’ 
(Riggio 2018, 53). Later, he calls my combination of Heidegger and SSK ‘a very valuable 
experiment,’ as well as ‘brilliantly insightful in how philosophically challenging and creative it 
is’ (Riggio 2018, 57). 
 
Sorry for laying that on so thick, but it is fun to repeat such stuff. Yet, that is then as far as it 
goes. Instead of developing one or more of these positive points, Riggio spends the rest of 
his time focussing on what he perceives to be the negative consequences of my choice to 
work at a disciplinary level. As we have seen, Riggio laments how vulnerable this allegedly 
makes me to ‘attacks’ from the likes of Sassower and Schyfter. Apparently he hopes to 
protect me from such perceived aggression. 
 
I appreciate Riggio’s concern, but I think I have done a good enough job on my own of 
defending myself against Sassower and Schyfter. I would have rather Riggio had developed 
his positive points, no doubt also delivering some excellent criticism along the way. For 
example, he could have helped to make my ostensibly ‘open-minded approach to problem 
solving’ less rare by more substantially engaging with it and encouraging others to adopt the 
same approach. I could have benefited from his advice, and I reckon others could have too. 
 
In my view, one of the biggest tragedies of the periodic disciplinary dogmatism one 
encounters in academia is that it often drives creative minds into a kind of extra-disciplinary 
exile. And I know how lonely it can be out there. Yet, rather than trying to pull me out there 
with him, I would have preferred it if Riggio had joined me in here where there is no end of 
action, not to mention loads of intellectual resources. It helps to keep one’s elbows up, for 
sure, and certainly also to have engaged and well-positioned allies like Palladino, who is, he 
emphasises, not invested in ‘disciplinary purity’ (Palladino 2018, 41). 
 
Let me make a final, more proximal point before I close this section. One key goal of Science 
as Social Existence is to defend the Edinburgh School’s ‘Strong Programme’ in SSK by 
removing the School’s vulnerability to sceptical attack (see also Kochan 2018b). Riffing off 
Riggio, I can now conjecture that the Edinburgh School’s vulnerability arises, in part, from 
their open-minded approach to problem solving, more specifically, their mixing together of 
two disciplines: sociology and philosophy. 
 
Yet, the Edinburgh School experiences friction between their philosophical and sociological 
interests, in the form of a sceptical attack. My diagnosis: they tried to mix sociology with the 
wrong kind of philosophy. They might have gone for Heideggerian phenomenology. By 









Hence I do for the Edinburgh School what Riggio thinks I should have done for Science as 
Social Existence. I release them from the disciplinary friction which led to their vulnerability. 
However, I do this, not by urging them to abandon disciplinarity altogether, but by nudging 
them onto a different disciplinary ground. Moreover, I could do this only by embracing the 
very disciplinarity that Riggio suggests I abandon, that is, only by digging down into the 
methodological and conceptual clockwork of Heidegger and SSK. 
 
Oh, Bother! – The Conceptual System Returns 
 
One thing I try to do in Science as Social Existence, especially in Chapter 7, is to turn 
methodological attention away from systems and towards subjects. Palladino correctly 
identifies this as having been motivated by my discontent with ‘perspectives that have 
increasingly come to dominate science and technology studies’ (Palladino 2018, 45). Indeed, 
in Chapters 2 and 3, I discuss how these perspectives have often sought to reverse the gains 
made by earlier SSK practitioners. 
 
My argument is that, by emphasising systems over subjects, contemporary theorists have 
often suppressed subjectivity as a fundamental explanatory resource. They shift attention 
from subjects to systems. The emphasis is usually then put on systems of practice, but it 
could also be on systems of concepts. Either way, the system is primary, the subject 
secondary. 
 
Palladino agrees with me that the system should not be viewed as more important than the 
subject (Palladino 2018, 46). Yet, in contrast to me, he sees subject and system as equally 
primary, as fundamentally co-constitutive. Palladino grounds this difference between us in 
my alleged equation of subjectivity with Being. He, on the other hand, equates subjectivity 
with Becoming, with a ‘performative operation’ (Palladino 2018, 45).  
 
I am less inclined to draw such a sharp distinction between Being and Becoming. In my 
view, Becoming presupposes Being, because Becoming is a change-of-state in Being, in 
something that already is, that already exists. In Science as Social Existence, I write: 
‘Grammatically, the phrase “the meaning of being” is similar in structure to the phrase “the 
thrill of a lifetime.” [...] A lifetime is a historical-existential space wherein thrills can happen. 
Likewise, being is a historical-existential space wherein meaning can happen,’ that is, a space 
wherein meaning can come into being, where it can become (Kochan 2017, 54).  
 
The subject, construed as being-in-the-world, is a historical-existential space wherein one 
finds possibilities for Becoming. Palladino’s ‘performative operation’ presupposes a 
performer, just as the concept of practice presupposes a practitioner. What or who a subject is 
– its meaning or significance – is the result of practice, but that a subject is – its existence – is 
not. A subject may experience itself as an unintelligible tangle of perceptions – as does, 
perhaps, a newborn baby – slowly acquiring meaning as it stumbles through a world shared 
with others, actualising or being actualised in accordance with the existential possibilities of 
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A system of practices or of concepts thus presupposes a subjectivity that does the practicing 
or the conceptualising. Since, following Heidegger, subjectivity is not just being-in-the-world, 
but also being-with-others, it is a necessarily plural phenomenon. Combined with 
Heidegger’s account of the subject, SSK thus becomes (necessarily but not sufficiently) the 
sociological study of scientific subjectivity in relation to the world. The primary explanatory 
resource is now the community of historically interacting subjects, along with the material 
resources they enrol in those interactions. 
 
The system-centred theorist reifies this inter-subjectivity, turning it into a system, scheme, or 
network with an agency of its own. The subject is thus subordinated to the power of the 
system. Combining insights from SSK pioneers Barry Barnes and David Bloor, I argue, 
instead, that ‘the system does not carry us along, we carry it along. We are compelled by the 
system only insofar as we, collectively, compel one another’ (Kochan 2017, 374). 
 
Herein lies the nub of my problem with Riggio’s apparently uncritical use of such terms as 
‘discipline’ and ‘conceptual scheme.’ In Science as Social Existence, I introduce Heidegger’s 
existential conception of science as his alternative to the, in his day, dominant account of 
science as a conceptual scheme (Kochan 2017, 59). In other words, Heidegger attempts to 
de-reify – to deconstruct – science construed as a conceptual scheme, arguing instead that 
science is, at its base, an existential phenomenon produced by interacting subjects in the 
world. 
 
This is how I view Riggio’s ‘disciplines.’ They are no more than historical communities of 
individuals interacting with one another in the world. The vulnerability Riggio sees in my 
disciplinarity is not vulnerability to the impersonal power of a system, but to discrete and 
concrete individuals who, for whatever reason, feel the need to attack. When one is attacked 
by an amorphous and impersonal ‘system,’ one may feel overwhelmed and powerless. When 
one is attacked by one or more fragile fellow humans, the odds look decidedly different. 
 
Those who profit from their social situation will often be invested in the status quo. One 
effective way for them to protect their investment is to reify their situation, painting it as an 
impersonal system, in the hands of no one in particular. They thus protect their profits, 
while obscuring their responsibility. This is why, on the penultimate page of Science as Social 
Existence, I cite Baudelaire, characterising the system-centred theorist as ‘a prince who 
everywhere rejoices in his incognito’ (Kochan 2017, 379). 
 
A Regrettable Absence and Two Allegedly Missed Alternatives 
 
For some readers, the preceding section will have brought to mind Michel Foucault. 
Palladino regrets that I say (almost) nothing about Foucault (Palladino 2018, 45). I regret it 
too. While writing Science as Social Existence, I was sharply aware of Foucault’s potential 
relevance, but I felt that I was already juggling enough. This is not an excuse, but an 










I have, however, criticised Foucault elsewhere (Kochan 2015b). Or have I? What I criticised 
was what Edward Said labels an ‘overblown’ and ‘extreme’ use of Foucault (Said 2000/1982, 
213). My most immediate concern was Ian Hacking, who is arguably allied with the system-
centred theorists I take on in Science as Social Existence. Hence, the ‘overblown’ interpretation 
of Foucault appears to be a tool of my opponents. But perhaps there is another 
interpretation of Foucault, one that could better serve me? I will leave that for someone else 
to decide. 
 
My research is now taking me in a different direction. Perspicaciously, Palladino has intuited 
something of that direction. He takes Sassower’s ‘possibly accidental’ mention of Spinoza, 
and suggests that a ‘Spinozist monadology’ may offer an alternative approach to some of the 
topics I address in Science as Social Existence (Palladino 2018, 44). Yet one accident follows 
another: for it was Leibniz, not Spinoza, who introduced a monadology. This wrinkle is, 
however, an opportune one, as it gives me an excuse to discuss both Spinoza and Leibniz. 
 
Leibniz attempted to solve the problem of mind-body (or subject-object) interaction by 
arguing for a ‘pre-established harmony’ between the two. The law-governed actions of mind 
and body track one another in a way preordained by God (Monadology §78 [Leibniz 1965, 
161]). This pre-ordination takes the shape of a rational plan, a ‘sealed blueprint’ (A 
Vindication of God’s Justice §82 [Leibniz 1965, 133]). Leibniz imagined God as an artisan who 
stands outside the world, guiding its interior operations according to a rational and universal 
plan. 
 
Spinoza, in contrast, viewed God as immanent in nature. For him, there is nothing external 
to nature (Ethics I, P18 [Spinoza 1994, 100]). The problem of mind-body interaction is 
solved because ‘the thinking substance and the extended [i.e., bodily] substance are one and 
the same’ (Ethics II, P7 [Spinoza 1994, 119]). Yet, for Spinoza natural events are also 
rationally and universally ordered: ‘the laws and rules of Nature, according to which all 
things happen, [...] are always and everywhere the same’ (Ethics III, preface [Spinoza 1994, 
153]). Here too, then, the world is governed by a rational and universal measure, but one 
implemented from within rather than from without. 
 
Both Leibniz and Spinoza seem to have viewed nature as a unified whole, a dynamic totality 
underpinned by a core set of logically consistent principles, a rational plan. They were 
therefore modern thinkers à la lettre. Insofar as Heidegger sought an alternative to modern 
rationalism, his two modernist predecessors would seem to offer, not different alternatives, 
but a retreat back into modernity. Yet this may be too quick.  
 
For Heidegger, the rationalistic impulse to grasp the world as a whole, as a ‘world picture,’ a 
‘basic blueprint,’ or a unified set of abstract axioms from which all else can be deduced, was 
a historically contingent impulse, generated and sustained within a specific cultural tradition. 
He worried that this impulse, were it to gain global hegemony, could squeeze out other, 
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Heidegger’s own search for alternatives to modernity was decidedly idiosyncratic. In Chapter 
7 of Science as Social Existence, I discuss his attempt to reconceptualise the ‘thing’ as a ‘four-
fold.’ Heidegger suggested that the thing be seen as a ‘gathering’ of earth, sky, gods, and 
mortals (Kochan 2017, 368ff.). 
 
Here is where Leibniz and, especially, Spinoza may still be relevant. Heidegger’s four-fold is 
an attempt to rethink – in non-modern and non-rationalistic terms – the panpsychism often 
attributed to Leibniz and Spinoza. This is the doctrine that, to one degree or another, mind 
is always present in body, that, to some extent or other, subjectivity is always present in the 
object. Hence, panpsychism may promise an alternative to the modern subject-object split. 
 
Yet, for Heidegger, this promise is only a half-measure, because the frame in which 
panpsychism unites subject and object is a universal, rationalist one. As I read it, the four-
fold attempts to dislodge things from this globalising frame. It is more of a recipe than a 
blueprint. The precise nature of the four ingredients, as well as the proportions by which 
they are mixed, may vary from one region to the next. Rather than imposing a uniform 
blueprint on the world, the four-fold embraces a plurality of potential combinations. A can 
of Coke may be everywhere the same, but each region will have its own daily bread. 
 
Postcolonial STS: A Path Forward or a Dead End? 
 
Palladino is once again perspicacious in suggesting that the route forward in respect of these 
issues may lie in anthropology (Palladino 2018, 46). For my part, I have been reading Tim 
Ingold’s phenomenologically inflected work. Ingold draws on Heidegger’s conceptualisation 
of the thing as a ‘gathering,’ and combines it with insights from the ethnography of animistic 
Indigenous groups (Ingold 2013, 215). Rejecting 19th-c. European construals of animism – 
wherein a thing is animated by a spirit that inhabits it – Ingold instead interprets animism as 
a ‘poetics of life’ (Ingold 2018, 22). 
 
Animism, as Ingold presents it, seems closer to Heidegger’s non-modern phenomenology of 
existence than it does to Leibniz’s and Spinoza’s modern panpsychism. Palladino notes a 
connection between this panpsychism and actor-network theory (ANT), currently a 
dominant position in science and technology studies (STS) (Palladino 2018, 44). It is worth 
noting, then, that Ingold explicitly opposes his anthropology of life to ANT, especially as 
represented in the works of Bruno Latour (e.g., Ingold 2013 & 2011). 
 
Ingold argues that animism – as a poetics of life – ‘betters even science in its comprehension 
of the fullness of existence’ (Ingold 2018, 22). I am less inclined to draw such a clean line 
between science and animism, in particular, and science and indigenous knowledge, more 
generally. Indeed, I have begun to explore how scientific and indigenous knowledges may 
sometimes be combined in ways that can respect and strengthen both (Kochan 2018c & 
2015b). 
 
In Chapter 7 of Science as Social Existence, I introduce Heidegger’s distinction between 









2017, 359ff.). These roughly correspond to a modern and a non-modern mode of 
experience. They also encompass panpsychism and animism, respectively. I argue in Science as 
Social Existence that a system-centred understanding of experience is one in which things are 
‘framed’ according to a universal blueprint. In contrast, poiēsis embraces pluralism, and thus 
resists the idea that life can be framed as a system, that it can be fully rationalised and 
reduced to a core set of concepts or practices. 
 
This returns me to Riggio’s ‘conceptual schemes.’ Picking up Heidegger’s concepts of 
enframing and poiēsis, Riggio treats them both as conceptual systems or ‘frameworks’ (Riggio 
2018, 55). As should be clear from the above, I reject this construal. In my view, enframing 
is a disposition to experience the world as ‘framed.’ Poiēsis, in contrast, refuses this 
disposition. Ingold’s animism, as a poetics of life, might be viewed as a mode of poiēsis – an 
existential openness to a world vibrant with life – rather than as a framework or scheme. 
 
Riggio expresses horror at the way Heidegger’s concept of poiēsis, in his only recently 
published Black Notebooks, ‘guides’ one towards anti-Semitism (Riggio 2018, 56f). I have not 
read the Black Notebooks, as I have no stomach for still more of Heidegger’s already well-
known anti-Semitic opinions and behaviour. But I do wish that Riggio had provided some 
specific textual evidence and exegesis, because, based on my own understanding of poiēsis, I 
find it difficult to see how it should ‘guide’ one towards anti-Semitism. 
 
According to Riggio, the Black Notebooks are ‘pro-Indigenous and anti-colonial, but also anti-
Semitic in equal intensity’ (Riggio 2018, 57). Since, in Science as Social Existence, I say nothing 
about Indigenous knowledge or colonialism, it is fortuitous that Riggio independently 
introduces these topics in his review, thereby allowing a link-up with Palladino’s suggestion 
that anthropology may offer a way forward. If I have understood him correctly, Riggio 
worries that poiēsis is a conceptual framework in which pro-Indigenous and anti-Semitic 
sentiments are logically inseparable. 
 
Since I do not think that poiēsis is a conceptual framework, I do not feel the force of Riggio’s 
worry. However, if he were right, then the obvious response would be to reject poiēsis as a 
tool for Indigenous Studies. This would hardly be a tragedy, since Heidegger has never been 
an authoritative figure in that field anyway. In any case, the best source for learning about 
Indigenous peoples is Indigenous people (e.g., Battiste & Henderson 2000; Cajete 2000; 
Smith 2012; and a book recommended by Riggio, with which I am not yet familiar, Simpson 
2017). 
 
But perhaps Riggio worries more deeply that, quite independently of the concept of poiēsis, 
Indigenous Studies may entail anti-Semitism? If this were true, then the consequences would 
be profound not just for students of Indigenous culture, but, more importantly, for 
Indigenous peoples themselves. More particularly, but less importantly, it would be a serious 
blow to those, like myself, who currently work in the emerging field of postcolonial STS 
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But we have now moved well beyond the boundaries of Science as Social Existence. It is a 
testament to the vital intelligence of my fellow symposiasts that the discussion has stretched 
much further than the book itself, touching also on broader, often more important, issues. 
Once again, I thank Raphael Sassower, Pablo Schyfter, Paolo Palladino and Adam Riggio for 
their vigorous engagement with Science as Social Existence. To those readers who have followed 
our conversation, my heartfelt thanks as well. 
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